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SUMMARY
"4
P:esent turbine engine non-containments happen too frequently for comfort,
althaugh fortunately the world-wide fatal accident level from this cause
has _ot been excessive.
By f_r the majority of turbine engine induced accidents lie in non-containments,
and herefore if the engine industry is to contribute to improved airworthiness,
this is the problem it must tackle.
i
Because -
(a) the world-wide non-containment rate shows no sign of .'
diminishing over the last decade,
(b) there seems to be no immediately obvious engineering
• avenues which will confidently lead to a quick reduction
of incidents,
(c) the weight penalty of total containment is high,
thl only valid solution for the immediate future seems to be to provide an
adequate level of lircraft invulnerability. _
This the CAA has attempted to achieve by introducing a requirement which it
believes to be objective and capable of _tional analysis. It can be applied
to new designs without undue economic pe.,alty and will enable an acceptable
level of airworthiness to be achieved.
J
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PART 1 The Perspective
At first sight, the reader may wonder what FIG 1 has to do with the title
of this paper or the purpose of this 'Workshop*. In fact it shows that for
more than 200 years we have been throwing pieces of hot metal at each other!
FIG 2 shows that we are still at it. We can, of course, take comfort from
the fact that the present situation is unintentional and not done with
*malice aforethought', but it must still be obvious to anyone closely
engaged in the aviation business that not infrequently an aircraft hazard
Is crea_ed by th. energetic debris arising from an engine rotor disintegration.
This hazard was introduced at the same time 88 turbine enK'lne8 and may
perhaps he regarded as ftmdamontal to them, since the rotation at high speed
of the sort of mama typical of modern engine spools ties up huge amounts of
energy. Some Idea of the destructive potential is given by the realisation
that the energy of rotation of a large modern engine can now be reaching
20 nLtllton ft.lb, and that across an aircraft can be approaching the energy
rejected Into the brakes during an abandoned tske-off. (FIG 3).
The potential for hazardous dsmage Is therefore obvious, although it will be
shown later that this particular hazLrd hag not been rospoostble for large
numbers of fata__._ll accidents. Tkerefore while It is proper, in fact necessary,
that the Industry and Authorities should look Lnto the whole situation, it is
important that perspective is maintained me that in a world where resources
are not infinite, a good balsnce of effort will be maintained.
?
Let us therefore spend a few m_nutes putting the whole problem into some kind
of perspective. FIG 4 shows an analysis of a large ntmber of 'accidents* to
public transport (is air carrier) turbojet aircraft. It is not an exhaustive
survey but it is based on world-wide accident records to a given list of
aircraft over a period from 1966 to 1976 inclusive.
(An accident here Is that defined in Annex 13 of ICAO Standards
and Roconmonded Practices. le. one in which -
(a) any person suffers death or serious injury ag a
result of being in or upon the aircraft or by
direct contact with the aircraft or anything
attached thereto,
or
,_ (b) the aircraft rooolwJg substantial dmms4p).
_ The total number of accidents in the survey Is 513, and the estimated aircraft
hours Lnvolvod, 103 nLtllLon. The. total aocidemt rate is thus z_nning at about
5 per 106 aircraft hoturs and the fatal rate at 1.4. The accident csusea nay
he broken down into -
. 299 due to operational reasons (58_)
134 due to airworthiness reasons (265_)
80 due to other (or undetornlned)
reagems (l_)
12
,_ • _. .....,..,: '4__ .,_ , , -, .,.'._./:. •,,.4 ,._ _,
1g78002127-002
The airworthiness •co,dents, which are the sort st primo interest to this
Work•hop, thus •cosset for roughly a quarter of the total, •t • rate of
1.3 per 106 aircraft houzs, and which nay qaln be broken down (FIG 5) tnto:-
55 due to powerplant re•noes (41_ of the airworthiness
accidents)
79 due to other than power- (595 of the airworthiness
plant reasons accidents)
FIG 6 then subdivides the powerplant reasons Into further detail, the chief
message of which, for the purpome of this paper, is that by far the majority
of powerplant catmed acctdentm are attz_butable to or directly involve an
engine non-containment of some form. The non-containment caused accident
rate is 0.4 per lO 6 aircraft hours, the rate involving fatalities being
fortunately lower at 0.03, this _ntltng to meet our current susie•ted
atrvorthinoms target of 1 per 10 v airor_t hour8 (for • sinKle engtneerlnE
cause) by a factor of 3.
This leads to the first msXn point I wish to asks (FIG 7) viz that -
'*any slgnlflcent /_provomsnt to the overall s_cldsnt scene by
virtue of action in the powerplont area must best lie in the
direction of diminishing the denser arising from non-cmmts£_mnt."
PART 2 Enzlne Statistics
Hsvtns decided (and I a sure mY 'Workshop' hosts will be &Tattfted to hear
It;) that we have s pa_Dblaa worth nttoek_agj It Is now neeeosary to _ig dsel_r
to s_ if we can an_srtLtn whore the problems sa_ arlaing. For a number of
years now, the Power Pllmt bepartlmnt of the Ok4 hag kept • record of all non-
contalnnont Incl4ents It could lay Its hands on. For UE prodmd englnes, we
have complete records, but of course our accuracy Io less for other oountrlee.
We are hovever, falrly sure that the hours used for deteralnlng the statistics
are accurate enough to allow falrly e_fldent use to be asde of the data.
FIG 8 shows the non-oont_Lnn_t rate, world-vlda, for the past 10 years or so.
Two obvious conolusinns etrlke m lldi&tely fron the data, le that the rate
is about I non-contalnmont per I0 @ _ hours, and that the rate has been
reanonably c_tant over _ae porlod.
j'
FIG 9 shows the memo date broken down into incidents arisinS fm eoapremso:s
,._ (including fans) as a_a£nst those arteln8 fFonl t_wblneo. The curves show that
tho:o Is llttl_ to ohooaJe between the two. thollgh po14utpaJ in _iow of the lsa_or
number of e_aproasor _ oeapmd vtth twwblnoso It oould hs said that
Individually turbine rotors s:o non plane to _sllu:o thins oonpromsor rotors.
13
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Non-containments involving only blades represent to some oxtent a failure
to meet existing international engine requirements which all demand blade
containment. However, the tests conducted are only required to demonstrate
containment of one blade, and obviously many real failures involve more
than this. Additionally, some non-containments of blades are produced by
the blade being punched through the cuing rather than breaking through
ballistically, and these types are of a less dangerous nature, since the
emergent energy is low. As might be expected• and as is borne out in
practice_ non-containments involving a failure of some part of the disc
are generally more dangerous than those involving blades. FIG 10 shows the
rate of such failures and FIG 11 the same data divided again as between
compressors (with fans) and turbines. The conclusions to be drawn are that
about half of non-containments involve a failure of some part of the disc,
again that the compressor/turbine rates are not dissimilar, and again that
there is no _eat sign of improvement over the years.
There are two other data that might be useful. FIG 12 shows non-coutaimaents
: grouped by 'phase of flight'. The criterion of prior to or post V1 is not
always detorninable from incident reports, but the volune of statistics is
probably enough to swamp minor errors. The data nay be interpreted in a
crude way as showing incidents divided into four rouihly equal flight phases,
viz prior to V1, V1 to power reduction, ¢liab_ ronaindor of flight.
Paragraph (f) below gives the data more accurately but in a way legs easy to /'
remember. FIG 13 attempts to show the underlying causes. Here we are on
much more difficult ground, since causes are treated very subjectively. For
: exa_le, it may be easy to see that a failure had its origin in combustion .
" chamber distortion, but whether the cause of that wan duo to poor operation,
faulty Bterial, errors of overhaul_ fundamental design, et¢, is often not
clear and can depend on who is making the judgement' It is, of course,
almost always the fault of someone else.* However, the Figure is attached
for what it is worth, and prim•tilT because of one aa£n conclusion which can
be drawn from it - that is that there is no obvious single item which if 4
tackled successfully would in itself produce a draaatlc /_prows_nt in the J
non-containment scene - a point to which we shall return later.
All the above data was recently presented to a UK committee Guapriging the
Ui[ engine and aircraft industries as well 8s the CAA, and I append below the
conclusions of that c_mLtttee in summary fozsa. (In case you think I me
pasei_ the buokp I should p_rhap• say I was a member of the committee).
: / (a) The average (world-wide) non-containment rate fron all
_'/ c_usas is I per million engine hours. Thls figure has
_ been fairly COnStant for 10 yearS.
Not...._@ Roughly one-quarter of these non-cOntainments have
caused aircraft drainage outside the oOnfine• of the naoelle.
The 'silnifioant' non-c_xataimmnt rate nay there£oaw be
: _garded as about I per million aircraft hours. It miaht
be noted, by z_forr_ng bac_k to FIG _, that about half the
'signi_eant' non-containments aa_ serious Onoul_h to be
classified as reportable accidents.
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(b) Of all non-containments, about half involve a disc failure of
some degree. The non-containment rate for disc failure is,
therefore, 1 per 2 million engine hours. As might be expected,
discs contribute more 'significant* non-containments than blades,
in fact twice as many.
(c) Of all non-containments about one-eighth have resulted in the
release of debris approaching or equal to a third of a disc.
The major fragment rate is, therefore, about 1 in 8 million
engine hours (say _ per 9 million aircraft hours).
(d) Compressors and turbines make about equal contributions to non-
containments. Fans provide perhaps 10_ of the total (based on
less experience obviously).
(e) Although depending on a somewhat subjective judgement, it appears
that about half the disc failures a_e of a secondary nature.
Of the primary failures, nearly half are attributable to HCF
(High Cycle Fatigue). No other single cause stands out on either
the primary or secondary re/lures.
(f) As to phase of flight, the following is broadly true (although
with the advent of engines whose rpm increase with altitude to
the extent that cruise rpm may exceed that of take-off, this
breakdowt may be modified).
Phase: T 0 before V 1 V1 to power reduction Climb Remainder
% : 35 20 22 23
(g) No single predom/nant cause can be identified the cure of which
would glv_ a drmsatlc decrease in non-contalnment incidents.
However HCF accounts for a hICh proportion and should therefore
be given special consideration.
PART 3 Possible Solutions
In considering what might be done to minimise potential accidents due to non-
conts£nmont, there are throe immediately apparent solutions (FIG 14) -
(£) We may work on the root causes of the 2allures and attempt
:: to olisttnate them.
(ll) We nay ussuoe that the failures vlll oontlnue to occur at n
rate higher than is tolerable, and attempt to c_taln all the
debris within a strengthened onKlne oasiS.
(lti) 'Je amy accept that .mQontalned debris will continue to he
g4merated and sake the sLtrcratt design smceptably invulnerable
to the debris by such amens as detleotlon, the Judlolotm slt/ng
st critical parts and st_cture0 suitable duplication whore
appropriate, azsmuring, eta.
lS
1978002127-005
The first solutionj being basic, seems right and attractive but as will be
shown later, a reduction in present non-containment rates of at least an
order of magnitude is necessary for this solution to be viable.
Unfortunately, as FIG 13 Indicates, something like a third to a half of all
disc failures are from causes to which the disc failure is secondary, and we
felt it would unrealistic to believe that any overwhelming improvement
could be made to such a large number of tmrelated prime causes. Even taking
those cases where the disc failure is itself primaryj there are still six or
seven fundamentally different causes, none of which carries any obvious
promise of easy solution and cure. Perhaps the relatively low number of
basic LCF faliures is interesting since this is a subject to which, after a
few early failures, a great deal of attention has been paid, obviously to
good effect. However, HCF, which now probably accounts for more failures
than LCF, is much more difficult to cater for, since it tends to arise in
much less predictable ways. I hope some other papers at this Workshop will
be devoted to that subject.
It was therefore reluctantly concluded in the CA& that there could be little
confidence in the engine industry'J ability to produce engines wh4ch within
the foreseeable future (by which we moan the next ten years) would achieve
significantly reduced levels of non-containment incidents, and nowhere near
the order of magnitude reduction fe would need. I say reluctantly in the
sense that regarding myself as a member of the engine fraternity, I an
disappointed that we cannot guarantee to deliver engines free from this
endemic disease. However, we must be honest enough not to try to avoid the
truth and to admit, even with rod recess our inability to be certLtn of doing
much better in the immediate future. (And I hope nothing hero said will In
any way dimihish the desire and intent of this Workshop to prove me completely
i wrong).
Moving to the second solution, this is also an attractive one to an
Airworthiness Authority since if we cannot stop the debris being generated, it
would be almost as good to keep it inside the engine. It also has merit in
lessening the danger arising frost such" tmavoidablo incidents as large bird
ingestion whore the benefit of total containment is obvious. Unfortunately,
after numerous discussions with both the engine and Ltrcraft ind_stries, we
were loft with little hope, in the present state of the art, of offecttng
containment without swingeing increases in engine weight, except possibly on
quiteJmall engines or APU's. Estimates of 1 pound per 10,000 ft. lb. of
energy to be absorbed or 2/3 pound per pound of bladed dine woiKht have bean
,, / variously calculated, the final results implying an _noreano of bare engine
/ weight of anything up to $05. Of course oonta£nmont does not have to be total,
." and it is interesting to look into partial oont_tnmont, for example of the smaller
, debris, together with possible deflection. N£PTC may be able to suggest ways
o£ reducing those figures, and I w411 be _teroatod to hear o£ their recent
work, but o£ course If the consideration o£ the larger pieces dictates the
desisn, contmannent of the smaller ones nay he _ess attractive.
Rovevor, the conclusion vo ros_hod, in association with our IanUfeCtUrorI
wu thnt the most reliable, pr_ticablo and oos_-effoctive solution is the
thi'-_, 1o to IakO the o£1_raft relatively _avulnerablo to any likely debris
which may affect it, (Tkou_a this decision vs_ one ght@h go felt vo had to
take in the time scHtAe go wore considor_aSp it would be quite proJmturo to
abandon all hope of sonoday achieving eolutiong one oF two, and such efforts
as are being susde by thie Workshop are to be encouraged to keep this difficult
task in active play).
]6
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PART 4 The UK Ro_uirements
The CAA, havlng re_ched the conclusion that the only practicable requirement
for the immediate future was to achieve a reasonable degree of aircraft
invulnerability then gave thought to the form which the requirement should
take. Phrases like "Shall minimise the risk" are very easy to put into
requirements and are attractive in that they can be agreed with industry
without too much argument mince the broad principles Involved are so
obviously sensible. Unfortunately, when the crunch comes_ it soon becomes
apparent that there i8 a considerable conflict of opinion as to where
minimising should stop_
The aim of the requirement in its simplest form Is clear, viz, that unless
an engine will contain any likely debris that it might generate, the chance
of catastrophe occurring to an aeroplane from being struck by such debris
should be something less than lO'8/aircraft hour. While this provides a
good aim, it was much more difficult for the aircraft industry to see a way
o_ being able to demonstrate compliance in a convincing way, since of the
two components contributing to the risk, le 1) the probability of debris
being generated and 2) the probability of the debris causing catastrophic damage,
the former and more critical component was completely outside the competence
of the aircraft constructor to assess. It was therefore decided to write
the requirem(mt such that only the latter term would be quoted, the former
being assessed by the CAA and appearing only Implicitly in the requirement.
I have already shown that a ftgur,a for debris generation of 1 per 106 engine
hours was well founded as an avern_e, and not subject to a particularly wide
wxiation over a range of current engines. Knowing that about a quarter of
the incidents caused 'significant' aircraft damagew ie damage outside the
nacelle, the 'significant' rate may be expressed as being in the order of
1 per 106 aircraft hours. Stating from this precept therefore, the aircraft
constructor needed to provide an additional _actor of about 1 per 1OO against
a 'significant' engine non-containment ending in catastrophe.
Thus the aircraft constructor would be left with an ansessmeat to make which
was well within engineering Judge_nt. The only further point remaining to him
was to have a definition of the sort of non-contain_mnt debris that he had to
consider, iea freedom _rom catastrophe of 1 in 100 against what? We again
_: decided that this Judgement was also outside the area of knowledge of aircraft
designers and in fact we doubt if even the engine designers can do much in the
:: , way of valid prediction since their avowed intent is to produce engines which
, neve____rfail in this way,
, We therefore decided that put experience was the only valid guide available
to us_ and although the roqui_omont should be written in 8 way flexible enough
to allow any peculiarities of an engine to be taken into account_ the failures
to be considered would be based on past history.
Thus the task was to provide a failure 'model' with whio/a the aircraft
constructor could assess him design aglctnst the 1/100 factor. Initially we
tried very complOXlWJdols which became so sophisticated that they defeated
their own purpose. In the end we decided to revert to a simple model even
thouKhj as would be oxpoctodp it would be so_wha_ arbitrary - that is to say
17
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°that we would never clstn that it represents the actual way in which any
given engine is most likely to fail - only that it provides a yard-stick
against which the aircraft design can be measured.
One of the obvious pieces o2 debris to be considered seemed to be the 1/3rd
disc piece (this being very near the aatheaattcally msxtmua energy of
translation sector and also coinciding with current FAA thinking on FAR 25.903(d)_.
We then studied the distribution st debris which had been shed in a selection
of previous non-contain]Bnt incidents and chose one further piece to
represent the mean of all the residual pieces which could not be considered
to be covered by the 1/3rd piece.
Thus, starting with the distribution of the JJlze of non-containment debris
from a number o_ incidents where Rolls-Royce were able to recover the debris
and assess the mass (and this is not a colmon state of affairs - often, thank
goodness, a lot of the debris disappears into thin air:) we were able to
construct a probability curve. (FIG 16). Having decided already that one of
the model pieces should be the 1/3rd disc, and wishing to represent the
remainder by one other arbitrary piece, it can be shown that this should be
of 1/20 dlsc mass. From the probability of each of these typ_s of failure
occurring, we could then devise a fiEure which described the desired level
o_ Invulnerability of the aircraft deStgD much that if engines continue to
fall at the sort of rate which hu applied in the past, the aircraft will have
.i
an acceptable level o_ airworthiness against t_is pLrttcul_r hazard. 1
Reference back to the data shows that the probability of the smaller (1/20
'" disc mass) piece is about twice that of the larger piece, lie therefore had
the equation : there is a eti=_'Lftcant non-contatD_ent (is one causing dsaage
outside the nacelle) every Itllton aircraft hours, two out of three of which
Ray be regarded as releasing a 1/20 piece, and one in three a piece getting
into the 1/3rd disc size ballpark. 8 If the t_rget risk froa this cause for
catastrophe is to be less than 10 per aircraft hour, staple aathemattcs
show that the invulnerability _actors if the allowance is equally proportioned
aust be 1/133 for the smaller and 1/66 for the ls_rger piece respectively, t
2 1 (, 10-6) 1 ___ 1 x 10 "8te _ (1 x 10 -6 ) x IT3 + • x 6"-6--"
We tested these factors alalnst as such experience as we could and we
concluded they were a bit touEh since even aircraft which had good records
could uot meet theR. We felt that this was probably because in estimating
'catastrophe', honest people were forced to be so, what pesstalsttct and
/ that aircraft dld ca occasion survive incidents which any prudent engineer
,_ would have graded catast:ophte. As a :esult we issued • paper for discussion
with factors of 1/100 and 1/30, to test as it wee, the teaperstu_ of the
water.
s
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Discussion with the aircraft Industry still left doubt whether these
figures were within the stat.e of the art. Fortunately, in the course of our
general work in dealing with incidents of a type which were potentially
catastrophic when they occurred but which could be expected to occur at a
low, unpredictable, frequency (is of a type which haVe become to be described
as 'unlikely though possible*) we had been developing the idea that they can
be dealt with by ensuring that if the unpredictable low frequency event does
occur, there must be a 'reasonable* chance of a survival, enabling the
problem to be exposed and corrected so as to avoid any possibility of a second
occurrence. The choice of a number for such a 'chance' i, arbitrary and
subjective and depends to some extent on the .average risk applicable to the
'unpredictable' event, but we had concluded that a chance of survival of 19
out of 20 was not unreasonable.
Taking the above Into account, It wag therefore decided we could reduce the
1 in 30 figure to 1 in 20 and the I in 100 to l In 60. It is this figure that
now appears in our Requirements. It is expected that it will result in
airworthiness risks In line with our target, but it cannot be too strongly
emphastsed that the risks are not intended to apply for the life of the
ai_craft, but assume that IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION WILL BE TAKEN SHOULD
ANY INCIDENT OCCUR. There must be no question of continuous exposure, or of
living with a problem once it is exposed.
Of course, we would be naive if we assumed that In real life failures will
cause debris like our model. We are not, and they won't. What we have done
is' crested a requirement against which a non-subjective estimate of a design
can be made. It is no more likely to represent the exact truth than an
adrcraft is likely to fly through a flock of exactly 4oz birds all perfectly
spaced at 1 per 50 sq in. We do feel the requirement will act as a good yard-
stick against which the non-containment danger can be assessed.
One or two further refinements serve to make the requirement complete:-
. (a) Dimensions. In many cases the debrt& will not be s_opped
but will lead to what I call the infinite hole - that ig
the part passes through all intervening structure. In this
cased the cross section area of the hole is important, and can
of course in theory be as large am the section of the failed
rotor. Hire again we have been arbitrary and assumed that
some blade bending will take place and that as a moan the two
model pieces should be assigned maximum dimensions of R and IR/
• / (R being the blade._._d disc radius) respectively. FIG 16 suaariags :
/ in pictorial form the sort of analysis which results.
, (b) Energy. We have made the simplified assumption that the
prescribed pieces will leave the engine with their full,
theoretical, energy of translation intact. This moans that we
have struck a rough balance between the engine absorption and
the neglected energy of rotation. I would be glad to have any
ideas _or improvement on this l_ bettor generalised assumptions
• would be preferable.
19
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(c) Averaging. Since the non-containaent ra_e used has boL,,, per
engine and not per disc, we are saying that a disc will fail
a': the frequency quoted, but we don't know which. It therefore
seemed fair to allow a certain _ount of averaging in assessing
the overall risk, allowing a disc presenting a rolativ_ly high
vulnora,ility to be offset by one with a low potential. Further,
the sam sort of thinking mooned pe_issiblo, and is allowed,
over the various pbu®s of £1ight, whereby the risk which varies
, depending for oxasplo on whether the fuselage is pressurised or
not can be averaged over the various regimes provided the through
flight total smets the requ£remnt.
(d) D:spersion. FIG 17 shows a distribution made o_ particle sizes
against the angle through which they had be_n deflected during
their flight fro1 the engine. We chose + 3 for the 1/3rd disc
mass piece and + 5° for the ssallsr one.--These may appear a
little on thJ. small side, but we feel that deflection is likely
: to be greatest as the speed end energy drops, and that the
dasaging energy is likely to be confined within these limits.
(e) Duplication. One lut consideration completes the model.
Since we have settled for a stylised failure involving only single
pieces, it is obvious that an automatic solution would be to
duplicate any vital part. To prevent this being possthle in a
foolish way, we have added a further clause requiring consideration
• of three pieces, dispersed randomly to each otherp tu respect of
duplicated its s.s only. The required factor _or the 3 pie • cue has
been adjusted accordingly.
2O
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sumt_l
Pzme_nt turbine onfino nem-oontatJ_ont8 hoppem too £roquontly for
comSurt, altbouth forttmatoly the wortd-vido _atal 8_¢idont levol
from this cau_ hag not boon oxc_goivo.
By f&r tho majority of tturb_ao I_s_no induood I_cidentg 11o 4n
ncn-c_mtaln_onts_ lind thorofOl_ it tho _&-lJao 4ndugt17 to to
coat_ibuta _o _Mpz_vod airgorth£nos8, thtg is tho problom it muat
tacklo.
Bocaume -
(a) tim vorld-_2de nm-_mtlLlnmmnt z_ ihowm no 8tKn
of (_lJl_aiJhtnJ ovor tho 18t docade0
(b) thoro hoeing to be no _odiately obvious en&_noertnl
avonm _ which will oml_idemtly load to • qlLtck
z_du©tion o_ Inc£_kmts.
(©) tho uoight pemalty o_ totsl conte£nm8o_ il high.
tho only valid molutiem £or tho lmmodiate tutu_o goemg to bo to
p_ov_do 8m 8doqusto lovol of 8_r_85t _avulno_sbility.
Thls the CAA has attm_tod to achieve by £ntrodu¢l_a_ • _u_re_nt
which it bellow_8 to be obJocti_ mad c_ablo of rational _alysls.
It cm be _pllod to new _si_ns without undue eoooo_¢ p_nalty and
will _a_blo sa a_ptsblo fowl o£ s/mrth/_sJ to be achieved.
I
I would _tko to thank tbo Ck4 tot pozu/selon to publash tb£s paper. It
as oosvemtlom81 to d/sso_tate one's aployoa5 _ may v/eros ozp_ogJod.
In tilts esso I am happy to se_ I do not hood to. I would bovovor oxpmss
n_ th_k8 to all n_ OOllOlq_og who bawl o_ta_butod _botbor dlmotly or
tk_o_h t_Iz _ w_k. to ltlU_tOWr _t tit/g _Z _y pOgNSS.
_|/1 " -_-___'"_"'_';_".W_"--T _ _4_.- -._ .... " --m'__. _.,., _, , ,,
.,.. , _,,_ . ._.
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EROT =4 x17=68 MILLION ft Ibs
Figure3. - ComparisonofEnergyofRotationofEngineswitll Energy
Rejectedto BrakesonAbandonedTake-off.
513 accidents ':
an accident rate of 5 x10-6
per a/c hour 299 operational
58%
; I,_ (82 fatal ) ,_
I
369 non-fatal ...
a fatal accident rate of 1.4 xlO-6 134 airworthiness
per a/c hour
(13 fatal)
144 fatal
103 xlO6aircraft h_rs
_:igure4. - Reasonsfor JetAircraft Accidents1q_-76.
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52
UNDERCARRIAGE
• 39%
299 OPERATIONAL
a/_ ho._ 55POWERPLANT
134 AIRWORTHINESS I 26% OFTOTAL
J_ Ai,-,_rt_i.o,,,r,_l 41% '
accident rlmte .
80 UNKNOWN OROTHER o 1_ • 1o-6 per
STRUCTURE & SYSTEMS i
20%
Figure5. - Causesof 'Airworthiness'Accidents,JetAircraft1966-76. !
41 i
52 NON CONTAINMENTS
299 Ui C (3 involved fatalities) 75%OPS.
., 513 55
134 _1%OFP.R
i ; FIRES OTHERTHAN o_AW.
' ___$_7S _ - WITH NONCONTAINMENT,_'j
80
3 REVERSERS 15%
_--_ UNKNOWN
" 3 COWLS 15%
3 OTHERS 15%
Figure6. - CausesotAirworthinessAccidentsAttributableto Powerplant.JetAircraft1966-76.
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DESCRIPTIONOF FAILURE UK ENGINES USENGINES
% %
MATERIALDEFECTS 6 I 25
MANUFACTURINGDEFECTS 0
>. MISASSEMBLY 0 10
HIGH CYCLEFATIGUE 33 )
_ LOWCYCLEFATIGUE 9 ) 15
-, )
a. COMBINATION HCF/LCF 3 )
OVERHAULPROCEDURES 16
OVERTEMFERATURE 9 ))
FOREIGNOBJE_.,_DAMAGE 3 )
DETACHMENTDUESHAFTOR 3 l
<_ BOLTFAILURE i) 50
Z RUBBINGAGAINSTSTATICPARTS 9 lO
u OVBSPEEDING 3
,,, )
HCFDUEBLOCKAGE 6 )
NOTE: FORUSENGINES, 20% 'UNKNOWN CAUSES'HAVE BEEN
ALLOCATEDIN THEABOVE SUB-DIVISIONSiN THESAME
PROPORTIONAS FORTHEKNOWN ONES.
Figure13.- CausesofDiscFailures.
I] Eh'mlnatePelmeFm'l#re$ J
2) CMtm'Rat £eleese#hbrt$
;' ly $#IN&le$&/eldlB9
3)Make_tlremftInv#l#erable
_ to PossibleStrikes
Figure14.- AcceptableAirworthinessSolutionsAgainstNon-containmentProblem.
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DISCUSSION
Tom Horeff, FAR
Gordon, in your statistics you referred to 55 accidents due to power-
plant reasons, of which 75% involved engine non-containment, or roughly forty
in the period between 1966 and 1976. A rather simplistic view would be to say
four non-containments per year. You added that one in four non-containments
penetrates the cowl, or roughly one per year. My question, Gordon, is do you
have corresponding data for passenger fatalities pertaining to the non-contain-
ment cowl penetration accidents that you referred to?
G.L. Gunstone, CAA-UK
Well, I think that we have just a slight misunderstanding of my figures.
I know that it's been very unfair to push so many figures at you all at once
but there are copies of my paper available which I'm sure you'd like to study
later. What I would say, Tom, is that in my definition an accident is not
necessarily a non-containment and a non-containment is not necessarily an
- accident. An accident in the ICAO definition is one which causes a serious
injury to a passenger or substantial damage to an airplane, and there are very
many more non-containments than there are accidents. I think that goes part
way to answer your question. I have studied about a hundred million engine
hours in the period taken, and in this hundred million engine hours (which *j.
could be perhaps 30 million aircraft hours) there have been 41 non-containment
accidents and three fatal non-containment accidents. I did not, in the charts
show those non-containments which did not become classified as accidents.
J.H. Enders, FAA
j Gordon, I have a question that was posed by the "no-improvement" charts
you showed. I don't interpret that data as implying that there has been no
_ improvement in engine technology from a containment point of view. Rather, i
the growth in engines: that is, the larger diameter and larger thrust engines
have continually posed a tougher problem to the designer to solve, and he's
' really improving in an absolute sense. To put it another way, he's really
keeping up with the problem, not letting it get worse. Now some people might
not agree with me, but truly the large diameter engine of today pose tougher
containment design problems than did the smaller aircraft engines of a decade
ago.
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G.L. Cunstone, CAA-UK
I basically agree. But I think there is in all aircraft engine design
a process of "brinksmanship". That is to say you push the design as far as
you dare. Your constraints are economics, thrust, ...and so on, and you do
not (unfortunately) apply all of the knowledge which you've acquired from
previous experience to making an engine or aircraft safer. You use some of
it, but the rest goes into making it cheaper. It is a matter of some judgment
as to where the proper balance lies, and I was simply quoting what the facts
are.
Could I just say, gentlemen, that I could bring only about 30 or so of
these papers with me. They are up there for distribution. If anybody can
easily share with a colleague I would ask him to do so for the moment. But
I will get a clip-board put next to them, and if any_)dy fails to get a copy
but would like one, if he will write his name and address I will have one
posted as soon as I get back.
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